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In analyzing firm entry and exit in  the small open economy of Belgium, this paper empirically 
shows that import competition and foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurs on 
product and labor markets.  These results are  in line with theoretical models of entrepreneurial 
choice in open economies that have explicitly included the effects of international competition on 
the formation of domestic entrepreneurs.  The empirical analysis demonstrates that the inflow of 
foreign direct investment in Belgium reduces entrepreneurship measured through the entry of new 
domestic firms,  while increasing domestic exit in the short term.  Moreover, the results suggest 
that the decision of foreign firms to  enter andlor exit a small economy is mainly determined by 
international conditions and less by domestic market conditions. 
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Theoretical models of firm formation have typically endogenized the supply of entrepreneurs in a 
closed economy setting, thereby  concentrating on  the  personal  characteristics of entrepreneurs 
including entrepreneurial capability (Lucas (1978), Oi  (1983»  and risk attitude (Kanbur (1979), 
Kihlstrom and Laffont  (1979».  Focusing on  open  economies  Grossman  (1984)  theoretically 
showed that import competition and foreign direct investment (FDI) hinders the formation of the 
'entrepreneurial class' in developing countries.  International competition causes the number of 
domestic entrepreneurs to fall since it leads to lower international prices on product markets and a 
crowding out effect of local ventures by foreign firms on the local labor market. 
Empirical work has operationalized entrepreneurship through the creation or establishmentof new 
firms.  However,  it  has  largely  neglected  the  impact  of  foreign  direct  investment  on  local 
entrepreneurship,  as  most empirical applications in the  entry/exit literature were developed in 
national industry contexts.  While recent research increasingly distinguished between domestic 
and foreign entry/exit, it has  not yet analyzed the direct interdependence between domestic and 
foreign entry.  Instead previous work has extensively studied the differential impact of entry/exit 
barriers and incentives for domestic versus foreign entry/exit (Gorecki (1976),  Shapiro (1983), 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1987),  Khemani and Shapiro (1988), Geroski (1991), Mata and Portugal 
(1997. 
By  not  taking  into  account  these  effects  of PDI,  previous  studies  on  entry  in  (small)  open 
economies may have produced biased results.  Belgium for example, traditionally characterized 
by  high  import  shares  and  a  large  presence  of  foreign  multinational  firms  (MNEs)  in 
manufacturing  industries,  has  consistently  reported  lower  (domestic)  entry  rates  than  other 
European countries (Eurostat (1998».  In a more recent period, Belgium showed a net outflow of 
FDI  together  with  a  simultaneous  increase  in  the  number  of  domestic  firms.  Although 
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991) in their study on  entry in Belgium,  have extended the 
typical national industry context of most entry studies and showed the importance of European-
wide growth and profit opportunities, they neglected the effect of international exposure through 
import competition and foreign direct investment as factors impeding the entry of domestic firms. 
2 The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the impact of international competition on domestic 
entrepreneurship,  and  to  analyze  if foreign  firms  have crowded  out  domestic entrepreneurs in 
Belgium.  The empirical analysis  also  considers  positive effects  of FDI on  entry in  line  with 
theoretical  models  in  the  international  business  literature  which  demonstrate  possible 
complementary effects between foreign a.tld  domestic firms  (Rodriguez-Clare (1996), MarktlSen 
and Venables (1999)).  Because of networking and spillover effects, foreign firms  may actually 
stimulate local entrepreneurship. 
While the crowding out effect of FDI on  local entrepreneurship  has  mainly been discussed in 
developing countries (Caves (1996)), this paper analyzes this effect in the context of Belgium, an 
open industrialized country.  Given the similarity between Belgium and other EC countries like 
Ireland  and  Spain  (Sleuwaegen  and  De  Backer  (2000)),  the  results  of this  analysis  are  not 
necessarily limited to Belgium but may carryover to other open economies. 
2.  Occupational choice, domestic entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment 
Firm formation  has  traditionally  been  studied  within  occupational  choice  models,  in  which 
individuals compare the wage they can earn with the entrepreneurial income they can  obtain if 
they  start  their  own  business.  The  first  theoretical  contributions  essentially  predict  that  the 
likelihood of individuals starting a new firm is  a positive function of persons' managerial ability 
(Lucas (1978), Oi (1983)) and a negativefunction of persons' risk averse attitude (Kanbur (1979), 
Kihlstrom  and  Laffont  (1979)).  Models  which  do  not  only  allow  for  differences  in 
managerial/entrepreneurial ability between individuals  but also for differences in  worker ability 
(which are reflected in  wage differentials),  show however that the best potential entrepreneurs 
may end up as wage workers (Jovanovic (1994)). 
The above  studies  have  typically  modeled  the  decision  to  become  entrepreneur in  a  closed 
economy  setting.  An  exception  is  Grossman (1984)  who  modeled firm formation  in  an  open 
economy and analyzed the impact of foreign trade and investment on  the formation of domestic 
entrepreneurs.  Grossman showed that import competition and foreign  direct investment causes 
the number of local entrepreneurs to fall as the result of lower prices on the product market which 
reduce  the  entrepreneurial  income  more  than  the  wage  income.  As  only  differences  in 
entrepreneurial skills are taken into account in this  model, the most capable individuals become 
3 entrepreneurs.  While foreign direct investment is  similar to  import competition with respect to 
product market competition, the entry of foreign firms generates however an additional effect on 
domestic entrepreneurship since these firms also crowd out domestic firms  on  the labor market. 
This crowding out effect does not only result in  a lower number of domestic  entrepreneurs  as 
discussed  by  Grossman,  but  also  gives  rise  to  a situation  where  the  best  entrepreneurs  may 
become  workers  in  the  MNEs'  affiliates  once  differences  in  worker  ability  are  taking  into 
account. 
The additional effects  of FDI on the labor market can be illustrated using Jovanovic's (1994) 
model of firm formation and extending it for the entry of foreign firms.  In an economy with one 
consumption good and two homogeneous factors of production (supply of capital K and labor L), 
individuals decide to start their own business or work for someone else according to: 
(1) 
where F(k,l) is the firm's output, p the price of the consumption good, r the rental rate and w the 
wage per efficiency unit.  Reflecting differences in  entrepreneurial  and  worker ability between 
individuals, Xi  and Yi  represent respectively the entrepreneurial and worker ability of individual i, 
while I./  Yj  represents the sum of worker abilities of the I workers employed in the hypothetical 
firm.  The left side of expression (1)  is the entrepreneurial income the individual gets if he starts 
up his own business, while the right side is the wage income the individual earns if he chooses to 
become a wage  worker.  Profit maximization by firm  owners  leads  to  the optimal choices  of 
capital (k) and labor (I) per firm, which together with the occupational choice expression in  (1) 
and the factor market clearing conditions determine the optimal level of domestic entrepreneurs 
(m). 
An inflow of foreign direct investment, which essentially entails new competition and the transfer 
of capital and technology exogenous to the conditions prevailing in the domestic market, changes 
the number of domestic firms in this economy.  Since firm specific advantages transferable across 
borders  enable MNEs  to  compete successfully in  foreign  countries  with  a  'better'  production 
technology compared to  local firms  (OLl-paradigm (Dunning (1993)), the corresponding higher 
wages paid by foreign firms2  skim the domestic labor market and decrease the labor supply for 
2 The 'better' technology and capital intensive production process make employees more productive in 
foreign companies than in domestic companies.  Given the first order conditions, this higher productivity 
4 domestic companies.  Similar to Jovanovic's result with respect to an increase in the capital stock, 
comparative statics  results  show that  the  derivative  of m  with respect  to  labor  supply L  is 
positive' 4, meaning that an inflow of FDI causes the number of domestic entrepreneurs to fall. 
The crowding out of local ventures by foreign firms on the labor market leads to a stronger rise in 
wages  than  in  entrepreneurial  income5,  stimulating  people  to  become  \vorker  instead  of 
entrepreneur.  At the same time this causes an increase in the average (domestic) firm size. 
The inflow of FDI not only results in a lower number of domestic entrepreneurs but may also 
alter the distribution of individuals becoming entrepreneur.  Foreign direct investment causes the 
best entrepreneurs to choose for worker, as MNEs want to hire the best individuals for managing 
their subsidiary and therefor implement a wage structure very favorable for people endowed with 
higher levels of entrepreneurial and  worker ability.  Assuming like Jovanovic that in  a  closed 
economy the best potential entrepreneurs happen to  be also the best workers6,  the most capable 
persons are effectively drawn into entrepreneurship, i.e. the persons to the right of Xl in figure 17 
The  entry  of foreign  firms  changes  the  earnings  structure  of entrepreneurs  and  workers  as 
competition between  foreign  and domestic firms  causes profits to fall,  and as  a  consequence 
entrepreneurial income and wages to decrease (I1ooM2  < I100Ml  and WooM2 < WooMI8).  As 
foreign  firms  pay  on  average  higher  wages  than  domestic  firms  (WMNE  <  WDOM2)  and offer 
additional benefits for very talented managers/workers9, these persons are worse off if they decide 
to stay entrepreneur.  The result is that foreign direct investment causes not only the number of 
domestic entrepreneurs to fall  (x,  - Xl < X  - Xl  )  but also the best (domestic) entrepreneurs to 
become workers. 
results ceteris paribus in higher wages.  We assume a dual labor market where wage differences between 
foreign firms and domestic firms may persist. 
3 Provided that the elasticity of substitution between k and I is less than I (Lucas (1978». 
4 dm/dL = m(LPn + KFld)/(K2pkk + 2KLPkl + L2Pll)  where Pkk, Pn and Pld are the second order derivatives of 
the production function P with respect to respectively k, I, and k and I 
The  positive  sign  can  easily  be  derived  by  combining  Jovanovic's  result  (dm/dk  <  0  or  m(LFn  + 
KFkl)/(K2Fkk + 2KLFld + L2FU) < 0) and the fact that the denominator in (2)  is equal to the sum of (KFkk  + 
LFld) and (LFn + KFkD. 
5 In Grossman's model (1984) there is no effect on wages because of the infinitely elastic labor supply in 
developing countries. 
6 With managerial ability denoted as x and worker ability y, y =  f(x) for some strictly increasing function f. 
7  Xl is the level of entrepreneurial capability for individuals are indifferent between becoming entrepreneur 
and wage worker. 
8 Wage incomes WDOM = WDOM.y and WMNE = WMNE .y. 
5 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
3.  An empirical model of  domestic entrepreneurship for Belgium 
Since Orr's (1971) influential work on  entry in  Canadian manufacturing, an  extensive literature 
has  emerged studying incentives  and  impediments to  firm  entry  and  exit (see for an  overview 
Siegfried and Evans (1994), Geroski (1995)).  Reflecting the typical closed economy setting of 
theoretical work on firm formation, most empirical applications in the  entry/exit literature were 
developed  in  national  industry  contexts  that  focused  almost  exclusively  on  domestic  supply 
factors inducing or impeding entry/exit.  An exception is Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991) 
who analyzed  the  importance of international demand  and  supply factors  for  entry and exit in 
Belgium. 
Recent  work  increasingly  distinguishes  between  different  types  of  entry  and  exit,  including 
domestic  entry/exit  (i.e.  by  domestic  entrepreneurs)  and  foreign  entry/exit  (i.e.  by  MNEs). 
Unfortunately this research has continued to disregard the effect of international competition on 
entry and exit of domestic entrepreneurs.  The analyses concentrated merely on  the differential 
impact  of incentives and  barriers for  domestic  and  foreign  entry/exit clearly  (Gorecki  (1976), 
Shapiro (1983), Baldwin and Gorecki (1987), Khemani and Shapiro (1988), Geroski (1991), Mata 
and Portugal (1997)).  The interdependence between domestic and foreign entry/exit has not yet 
been analyzed. 
By  not  taking  into  account  the  negative  effect  of  international  competition  on  domestic 
entrepreneurship, previous studies on entry/exit in  (small)  open economies  may  have produced 
9 Examples are bonuses, stock options, promotion overseas ...  which essentially means giving the best 
individual a kind of entrepreneurial income. 
6 biased resultslO•  Aggregate data of entry in Belgium for example suggest a real effect of openness 
on domestic entrepreneurship as Belgium reported lower entry rates while import competition and 
the presence of multinational firms were consistently higher than in other EC countries (Table 1). 
Likewise, in the most recent period Belgium shows a net outflow of FDI and a simultaneous rise 
in the number of domestic firms (Table 2), 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
This paper empirically assesses the role of international competition in the formation of domestic 
entrepreneurs by  linking domestic entry/exit in  Belgium during the  years  1990-1995  to  import 
competition  and  foreign  direct  investment  on  the  industry  level.  Based  on  the  occupational 
choice  models  of section  2  it  is  hypothesized  that  domestic  entry  (i.e.  number  of domestic 
entrepreneurs starting their own business) is negatively affected by increasing import competition 
and  the  inflow  of FDI.  Likewise,  in  explaining  domestic  exit,  it  is  expected  that  import 
competition and foreign direct investment stimulate the exit of domestic firms. 
In line with previous research, entry and exit are modeled as  responses to  departures from long 
run profits  II  where long run profitability  is  a function  (typically  linear assumed)  of entry/exit 
barriers.  Since the  differences  between  actual  and  long run  profits  are  expressed  as  industry 
averages masking differences in  efficiency between firms,  also replacement (exit induces entry) 
and displacement (entry induces exit) effects are included in the analysis.  The inclusion of lagged 
exit and entry variables controls for the fact that less efficient incumbents are replaced/displaced 
by  more  efficient  entrants12•  The empirical  model  supplements  this  'traditional'  set  up  by 
including  import  competition  and  foreign  direct  investment  as  moderators  that  are  largely 
exogenously determined.  Previous research has  shown indeed that other than domestic (i.e.  of 
Belgium) factors were responsible for  the large FDI inflow in Belgium, including the effects of 
European  integration  which  forced  multinational  firms  to  serve  the  European  market  from  a 
10 Although Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991) acknowledge the strong discipline of international 
competition as being important, import competition and foreign direct investment were not included in their 
analysis. 
11  Also called limit profits (Bain (1956». 
12 Modeling entry and exit separately as gross variables instead of modeling net entry, prevents that 
symmetry is imposed on the entry and exit processes. 
7 limited number of centrally located subsidiaries (Sleuwaegen (1987), Motta and Norman (1990», 
While the  activities  of multinational  firms  were not  primarily targeting  the  Belgian domestic 
market,  the  inflow  of foreign  direct  investment  nevertheless  may  have  affected  domestic 
entrepreneurship through the supra discussed product and labor market effects, 
Entry and exit in industry i at time t are modeled according to the following short run response 
functions: 
DOMENTRYi,t  bo + b1PROFITi,t_1 + b3DOMGROWTHi,t_1  + bJ>HYSCAPi,t_l + bsSCALE i,t-l  (2) 
+ b6DOMEXITi,t_l  + b7IMPGROWTHi,t_l + bsFORENTRYi,t_l + 
b9FOREXITi,t_1  + blOLINKi,t_1 
DOMEXITi,t  bo + b1PROFITi,t_l + b3DOMGROWTHi,t_l  + b4PHYSCAPi,t_1  + bsSCALE i,t-l  (3) 
+ b6DOMENTRYi,t_l  + b7IMPGROWTHi,t_l  + bsFORENTRYi,t_l + 
b9FOREXITi,t_l  + blOLINKi,t_1 + NUMDOMi,t_l 
The dependent variables in this model DOMENTRYi,t and DOMEXITi,t are expressed as entry 
and exit rates, and are defined as the number of domestic entrants (exiters) in year t divided by the 
total number offirms in year t-l in the industry13, 
The variable PROFITi,t_l  measures the actual profit level  in  an  industry  and is defined as  the 
industry's average price cost margin, while the variable DOMGROWTHi,t_l  measures the growth 
rate of the domestic market14,  Previous research showed that entry is higher in more profitable 
and rapidly  growing  industries,  while  exit is  stronger in industries  where profits  and market 
growth  are  lower  (Siegfried  and  Evans  (1994),  Geroski  (1995»,  The  coefficients  of these 
variables are hypothesized to be positive in the entry-equation while negative in the exit-equation, 
As entry and exit responded to departures from long run  profits (Geroski (1991», a three year 
moving average of past price cost margins and market growth rates was used in constructing the 
variables, 
13 The entry rate corresponds to the first year of reported positive employment. 
14 The domestic market measures the total sales volume and is calculated as the sum of domestic sales and 
imports minus exports 
8 A  number  of observable  proxies  for  barriers  to  entry  is  hypothesized  to  affect  the  level  of 
(unobservable)  long  run  profits.  Physical  capital  intensity  (PHYSCAPi.t_ 1  defined  as  the 
logarithm of the value of industry's fixed  assets over total employment in  the industry) and  the 
scale intensity  of industries (SCALEi.t.1 defined as  the logarithm of the median size in  terms  of 
value added) have been included  as factors  hindering entry.  Since entry  ba..rriers  also act as exit 
barriers, the effects of the variables PHYSCAPi.t_ 1 SCALEi.t.1 are predicted to be negative both in 
the  entry  equation and the exit  equation.  In industries that require  large  physical investments 
and/or a large  scale of operation in  order for  firms  to break even,  excess profits persist longer 
without inducing entry.  At the same time large investments discourage exit if they have a sunk 
cost character.  Moreover with falling profits, firms typically postpone the decision to exit given 
the limited  alternative use  of industry specific  assets  and  the  value  of waiting if profits  have 
shown important variation in the past (Dixit and Pindyck (1994». 
The sign of the lagged exit variable (DOMEXITi.t_ 1)  in the entry equation is  hypothesized to  be 
positive as entry consists to some extent of the replacement of exiting firms, with exit providing 
room  for  potential  entrepreneurs  in  the  industry  (Sleuwaegen  and  Dehandschutter  (1991), 
Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992)  Johnson and  Parker (1994».  Displacement on the  other hand 
concerns the positive effect of entry on exit, from new entry that results in stronger competitive 
pressure leading to the exit of incumbent firms.  Consequently, the coefficient of the lagged entry 
variable (DOMENTRYi.t_ 1)  in the exit equation is hypothesized to be positive. 
The impact of international competition on domestic entrepreneurship is captured in the variables 
lMPGROWTH,  FORENTRY  and FOREXIT.  Consistent with  Grossman  (1984)  the  variable 
lMPGROWTHi.t_ 1 (measured as  the growth rate  of imports in  year t)  is  supposed to negatively 
affect domestic  entry since lower prices on  product markets decreases entrepreneurial incomes 
more  than  wages,  inducing  individuals  to  become  worker  instead  of  entrepreneur. 
Correspondingly increasing import competition is  predicted to  have a negative sign in the entry 
equation, while positive in the exit equation. 
Focusing on the impact of foreign  direct investment on  domestic entrepreneurship, the  sign  of 
lagged foreign entry (FORENTRYi.t_ 1)  is predicted to negatively (positively) affect domestic entry 
(exit) from stronger competition on the product as well as labor market.  Likewise, the coefficient 
of lagged foreign exit (FOREXITi.t_ 1)  is hypothesized to be positive (negative) in the entry (exit) 
equation.  The  variables  foreign  entry  and  exit  (FORENTRYi,t_l  and  FOREXITi,t_l)  are 
9 analogously defined as domestic entry and exit variables, i.e. the number of foreign firms entering 
(exiting) in year t-l divided by the total number of firms in year t-2. 
The empirical model also considers possible positive effects of FDI on domestic entrepreneurship 
as  managerial  skills may  spill over to  domestic  firms  from  domestic  managers  leaving foreign 
firms  and starting up  their own business, and/or by domestic entrepreneurs  watching successes 
and mistakes of foreign firms (Caves (1996».  Also, networking activities of foreign firms  may 
induce  domestic  entry  through  buyer-supplier relations  and/or  knowledge  spillovers.  Recent 
theoretical work in  international business  increasingly  modeled  the  positive effects  of FDI on 
domestic  entrepreneurship through  backward  and  forward  linkages,  showing that  MNEs  may 
foster the development of domestic firms in the host country (Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen 
and Venables (1999». The inclusion of the variable LINKi.t.1  controls for the existence of these 
positive networking and learning effects.  The variable is defined as the growth in foreign firms' 
sales in  related industries  15,  multiplied by  the importance of outsourcingl6 for foreign  firms  in 
Belgium.  Linkage effects are expected to  be  more important in  industries where foreign firms 
outsource an important share of their activities  17. 
The variable NUMDOMi.t.1  (i.e. the logarithm of the number of domestic firms) is included in the 
exit  equation  to  control  for  differences  across  industries  in  the  presence  of domestic  firms. 
Industries where more domestic firms are active should reveal, ceteris paribus, a higher domestic 
exit rate measured as the ratio of exiting domestic firms over the total number of firms. 
4.  Results 
The empirical model is tested against data on  129 manufacturing industries in Belgium defined on 
the NACE 3-digit level.  As observations for the period  1990-1995  are pooled,  year dummies 
15  Related industries are defined as industries belonging to the same NACE-2 digit level. 
16  Calculated as  I minus the ratio value added over sales ofMNEs; this ratio is a proxy for the average level 
of vertical integration of MNEs in industries. 
17  Apart from some case studies especially in developing countries, the positive link between FDI and 
domestic entrepreneurship has not been statistically established in empirical work.  Instead, the positive 
effects of MNEs are analyzed in terms of productivity enhancements in domestic firms (see for an 
overview Blomstrom and Kokko (1996». 
10 allow for time specific effects (Kmenta (1997».  The use of a censored estimation procedure was 
necessary to account for zero cells in the data set (Tobin (1958». 
As the variance of entry/exit rates differed substantially across industries, we estimated industry-
specific variances (cr2j) following Dunne and Roberts (1991): 
where the ejt  are the residuals of estimating (4)  and (5).  These industry-specific variances were 
used to obtain weighted Tobit estimates in the entry and exit equations. 
Tobit-coefficients  cannot  be  interpreted  as  ordinary  regression  coefficients.  Multiplying  the 
coefficients with the fraction reported in the last row of table 3, ensures a proper discussion of the 
estimated  results  (McDonald  and  Mofitt  (1980»18.  The  fractions  for  the  domestic  entry  and 
domestic exit equation are 0.906 and 0.915 respectiveli9,  implying that more than 90%  of the 
total change in the domestic entry/exit rate (resulting from changes in the independent variables) 
is generated by marginal changes in the number of entering foreign firms, whereas less than 10% 
is generated by changes in the probability of foreign firms entering at all. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Consistent with previous studies on gross entry, the results show that domestic entry is higher in 
more  profitable  andlor  growing  industries.  Past  profitability  (PROFIT)  signals  profitable 
opportunities  to  domestic  entrepreneurs,  while  a  strong  growth  of  the  domestic  market 
(DOMGROWTH)  accommodates  a larger  number of firms.  The  positive coefficient  of past 
domestic exit (DOMEXIT)  suggests  that the exit of domestic entrepreneurs in  the  year before 
creates additional room for the entry of new domestic entrepreneurs.  The negative and significant 
18 These authors show that the change in the dependent variable is composed of (I) the change in the 
dependent variable of those observations where entry> 0, weighted by the probability of entry being above 
zero and (2) the change in the probability of entry being zero weighted by the expected value of the 
dependent variable if above zero. 
19 The fraction are computed by evaluating the model at the mean of the independent variables. 
II coefficient of PHYSCAP demonstrates that the barriers to entry  are higher in capital intensive 
industries resulting in less entry of domestic entrepreneurs in these industries20. 
The results  in  table  3 support  the  main  hypothesis  that  international  competition  hinders  the 
formation of domestic entrepreneurs.  The negative and significant coefficients of IMPGROWTH 
and FORENTRY clearly suggest that import competition and the inflow of FDI have a negative 
short term effect on the entry of domestic entrepreneurs.  Strong import competition causes prices 
to  fall  on  product markets  and  discourages  domestic  entrepreneurs  to  enter the  shrinking the 
domestic market.  The inflow of FDI impedes the  entry  of domestic entrepreneurs, because  of 
stronger competition on the product market and the skimming off the (best) workers on the labor 
market. 
Also the results for the domestic exit equation clearly support the crowding out effect of domestic 
firms by foreign firms.  The positive coefficient of FORENTRY demonstrates that the inflow of 
FDI forces  domestic  entrepreneurs to  exit,  because of lower prices on product markets  and/or 
higher wages on the labor market (encouraging domestic entrepreneurs to become wage workers). 
The results for the LINK variable in both equations show no  evidence in favor of networking 
effects.  However, linkage effects between MNEs and domestic firms may partially account for 
the positive coefficient of FOREXIT, such that the exit of foreign firms may directly result in the 
exit of domestic supplying/buying firms. 
The results in table 3 further demonstrate the existence of important impediments to exit because 
of capital  investments  and  scale  effects,  shown  by  the  significant  negative  coefficients  of 
PHYSCAP  and  SCALE.  The  observed  symmetry  between  entry  and  exit  barriers  can  be 
attributed to sunk cost, as the sunkness of investments directly discourages exit as no (or limited) 
valuable alternative use for the investments exist.  At the same time sunk costs provide incumbent 
with a credible threat to remain in the industry thereby deterring entry of new firms.  Industries 
characterized by lower barriers to entry and exit show a persistent higher turnover of firms than 
industries in which barriers to entry and exit are substantial.  The positive sign of DOMENTRY 
confirms the hypothesis that new entrants in  turbulent industries  induce the  exit of incumbent 
firms. 
20 The insignificant coefficient of the SCALE-variable is in line with previous work (Baldwin and Gorecki 
(1987), Jeong and Masson (1991), Mata (1993)).  Unlike that on capital requirements, the evidence on scale 
12 The empirical model has also been estimated for foreign entry and  exit, with foreign entry and 
exit rates instead of the domestic entry/exit rates as dependent variables.  The results are reported 
in table 3 and confirm our working hypothesis that other than domestic (i.e. of Belgium) factors 
have motivated the  inflo\x/  and  outflo\l,l of PD! in  Belgium; only market  grov;/th  seem to  have a 
(small) incentive effect on foreign  entry and  exit.  The reported coefficients  in  table 3 for  the 
foreign entry  and  exit equations also demonstrate that foreign  entry/exit is  more  prominent in 
capital  intensive  industries.  This  observation  is  consistent with  previous  empirical  work that 
barriers to domestic entry/exit can easily be overcome by foreign multinationals. 
The  results  for  the  lagged entry  and  exit  variables  suggest  that  MNEs  are  less  hampered  by 
domestic competition than domestic firms are by foreign competition.  The negative coefficient of 
DOMENTRY in the foreign entry equation is relatively small, (-0.138 x 0.167) indicating that in 
the  short  run  domestic  entry  discourages  MNEs  to  enter the  industry  only  to  a  small  extent. 
Further on, unlike the fact that foreign entry forces domestic firms to exit, domestic entry seems 
not to induce the exit of foreign firms.  On the other hand foreign exit is negatively affected by 
growing import competition; industries where imports rise strongly indeed report higher exit rates 
for  foreign  firms.  Import competition  does  however not  deter the entry  of foreign  firms  in 
Belgium; instead foreign entry is in principal the replacement of foreign firms that have exited the 
year before. 
5.  Conclusion 
In analyzing firm entry and exit in the small and open economy of Belgium, this paper presents 
evidence that import competition and foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurs 
on product and  labor markets.  The empirical analysis demonstrates that the inflow of foreign 
direct investment decreases domestic entry while increasing domestic exit in the short term.  The 
empirical analysis showed no  evidence of networking and  linkage effects between foreign  and 
domestic firms as  suggested in some of the recent theoretical work.  The results further suggest 
that the entry and exit behavior of foreign firms is  only hampered to a small extent by domestic 
economies as barrier to entry is ambiguous. 
13 competition.  The  decision  of MNEs  to  enter or exit a small  economy  like Belgium appears 
principally  determined  by  international  factors,  i.e.  factors  outside  the  domestic  market  of 
Belgium. 
Ho\vever, the observation that the inflo\v of MNEs negatively affects domestic entrepreneurship 
does not justify restricting measures against foreign direct investment knowing that multinational 
firms  typically transfer new  technology  and create  substantial  value  added  in  host  countries. 
Moreover the empirical analysis has focused on short term effects of international competition on 
domestic entrepreneurship.  Further research  is  needed on  long term effects  of FDI including 
positive networking effects that may only materialize after a number of years. 
14 Table 1: Entry rate2],  import competition and FDI,  1990 
%  entry rate""  import share"3  inward FDI stock 
Belgium  10.9  71.2  18.1 
Denmark  14.3  30.1  7.1 
France  13.3  22.6  7.2 
Germany  20.1  26.1  7.4 
Ireland  nJa  53.8  22.5 
Italy  6.5  20.7  5.3 
Netherlands  14.5  49.6  25.9 
Portugal  10.7  45.4  7.6 
Spain  nJa  20.5  13.3 
United Kingdom  5.9  27.1  22.3 
21  Due to major differences in legislation between countries, exit rates are not comparable across countries. 
22 Data for France and Portugal are 1989 figures.  Source: Eurostat (1993), SME Observatory 
23  in % of GDP; Source: Eurostat 
15 Table 2: Number of  domestic firms and MNEs in Belgium, 1990-1995 
J.T~ u  .. "  .. ,c,u""uu·"" J'"  ""~  A.JVII(,  13 ......... J'"  'If,,) 
1990  1.002  15.583 
1991  1.002  16.687 
1992  985  17.402 
1993  972  17.755 
1994  959  17.459 
1995  924  16.741 
16 Table 3: Regression results 
Tobit-coefficient  DOMENTRYj , t 
(standard error) 
DOMEXITj,t  FORENTRY~t  FOREXIT~t 
N=645 
CONSTANT  0.171****  0.115****  - 0.135***  - 0.046* 
(0.021)  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.025) 
PROFITl•I.I  0.l23***  0.039  0.092  0.003 
(0.040)  (0.033)  (0.069)  (0.040) 
DOMGROWTHi, I-I  0.078****  - 0.017**  0.079**  - 0.Ql8 
(0.022)  (0.009)  (0.032)  (0.015) 
PHYSCAPi• I-I  - 0.014****  - 0.014****  0.018***  - 0.001 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
SCAL~.I_I  - 0.001  - 0.002*  0.001  0.001 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
DOMENTRYi•I_ 1  0.164****  - 0.139**  0.002 
(0.024)  (0.058)  (0.031) 
DOMEXTI\  I-I  0.118***  0.102  0.045 
(0.045)  (0.072)  (0.044) 
IMPGROWTHi, I-I  - 0.026****  0.004  - 0.004  0.021** 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.009) 
FORENTRYi• I-I  - 0.291 **  0.l99**  0.015 
(0.118)  (0.099)  (0.098) 
FOREXITi• I-I  - 0.147  0.398**  0.659** 
(0.191)  (0.165)  (0.310) 
LINKi.I_ 1  - 0.007  0.004 
(0.005)  (0.007) 
NUMDOM  0.005** 
(0.002) 
NUMFOR  0.012**** 
(0.002) 
YEARDUMMIES  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
cr  0.035  0.029  0.038  0.023 
fraction  0.906  0.915  0.167  0.241 
LogLikelihood (LI)  1176.3  1275.8  22.5  154.7 
LogLikelihood (LO)24  239.9  456.5  -111.9  - 105.3 
*  p < 0.10; 
**  p <0.05; 
***  P < 0.01; 
****  p < 0.001; 
24 La is the log likelihood of the model with all coefficients, except the intercept term, equal to zero; LI is 
the loglikelihood of the proposed model. 
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22 ANNEXl 
Descriptive statistics of  the independent variables 
Mean  Standard deviation 
PROFITi• I-I  0.093  0.044 
DOMGROWTHi• I-I  0.047  0.094 
PHYSCAPi• I-I  6.981  0.710 
SCALEi•I_1  2.417  0.943 
DOMENTRYi• I-I  0.109  0.123 
DOMEXITi• I-I  0.064  0.067 
lMPGROWTHi• I-I  0.025  0.267 
FORENTRYi• I-I  0.009  0.063 
FOREXITi• I-I  0.006  0.052 
LINKi•I_1  0.048  0.378 
23 ANNEX 2 
Correlation matrix of  the independent - lagged variables 
PROFIT  DOM  PHYS  SCALE  DOM- DOM- IMP- FOR- FOR- LINK 
GROWTH  CAP  ENrRY  EXIT  GROWTH  ENTRY  EXIT 
PROFIT  l.ooo  0.018  0.270*  0.017  0.105*  0.027  - 0.01l  0.130*  0.013  - 0.053 
DOMGROWTH  l.000  - 0.034  - 0.037  0.212*  - 0.034  0.415*  0.107*  - 0.009  0.052 
PHYSCAP  l.000  0.471*  - 0.078  - 0.123*  - 0.013  0.1l6*  0.287*  - 0.007 
SCALE  l.000  - 0.020  - 0.056  0.033  0.099*  0.008  0.102 
DOMENTRY  l.000  0.018  0.024  - 0.024  - 0.070  0.027 
DOMEXIT  l.000  0.019  - 0.044  0.051  - 0.084 
IMPGROWTH  1.000  0.015  - 0.017  0.078 
FORENTRY  1.000  - 0.013  0.080 
FOREXIT  l.000  - 0.214* 
LINK  1.000 
*  p<0.05 
24 